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1Who Will Write?
While victors generally disagree, common wisdom holds that it is they who 
write the history. The Spanish Civil War, however, had no conclusive winner. While 
Francisco Franco ousted his opponents and clung to power for nearly four decades 
after the end of hostility, the international movement for which he stood was 
discredited within six years. Following their military defeat, Franco’s enemies moved 
into exile and became the heroes of anti-Fascism when it had become a universal 
value. While Franco controlled the archives and presses in Spain, his enemies could 
not be silenced. Though the military phase of the war ended in 1939, the fight for 
‘hearts and minds’ continued for decades. Ironically, when the Caudillo finally died 
in 1975, the people of Spain tacitly agreed to a pacto de olviedo (pact of 
forgetfulness), ignoring the legacy of the war, and Franco, entirely.1 In Spanish 
political life it appeared for a time that no one was to set pen to paper at all. While 
debate about the Spanish Civil War is still somewhat taboo on the peninsula, it has 
raged for decades in the forum of foreign public opinion.
In the mid-1930s, before the Spanish war began, all of Europe awaited the 
impending showdown between Communism and Fascism, the two poles of the 
ideological spectrum.2 The origins of that conflict can be found in the 1920s 
1
 When Franco died only one head of state, Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, attended his funeral 
despite the fact of Spanish membership in most important international organizations.
2
 Josef Stalin hoped to see Capitalism and Fascism fight it out but the two were just slightly less at 
odds than he had hoped.
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following the Bolshevik triumph in Russia, Stalin’s consolidation of power, and the 
establishment of the Communist International (Comintern). Many in the West 
considered Communist subversion to be a real and immediate threat. In the United 
States, the House Committee on Un-American Activities held hearings about the 
Communist menace during the 1920s and the Dies Committee continued such 
investigations in the 1930s.3 In reaction to the perceived Communist danger, among 
other factors, significant fascist parties formed in Germany, Italy, France, Austria, 
and other democratic nations.4 Under Mussolini, Hitler, and Dollfuss these parties 
seized power in Italy, Germany, and (eventually) Austria during the years preceding 
the Spanish Civil War.
The accession of Fascist dictators to power in Europe, especially Germany 
where the Communist party had previously enjoyed its strongest following, alarmed 
the Comintern and Josef Stalin. The tactics of the so-called ‘3rd Period’, attacks 
against Socialist leaders as obstructers of the working class and efforts to undermine 
Socialist organizations from within, had failed miserably and, with the rise of Nazism 
in Germany, had placed the first ‘workers’ state’ in geo-political jeopardy. 
Communist leaders in France, Spain, and Britain took some initiative to heal the rifts 
between themselves and the Socialists but could not act officially without the 
3
 It should be noted that Martin Dies, the chairman of the committee sought to examine rightist 
organizations such as the German-American Bund as well.
4
 See Peter H. Amann, “A ‘Dog in the Nighttime’ Problem: American Fascism in the 1930s,” The 
History Teacher, 19:4 (August 1986): 559-584. Amann provides a cogent analysis of the many 
organizations considered ‘proto-fascist’ which failed or turned away from outright Fascism in the 
United States. He extends the argument to include Britain and other countries with ‘deeply rooted 
liberal or democratic traditions’. For a competing, contemporaneous view, see Raymond Gram Swing, 
Forerunners of American Fascism (Books for Libraries Press: Freeport, NY 1935).
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approval of Moscow.5 Eventually the Soviet Union and Comintern resolved to offer 
alliances to all leftist parties so as to create a common, ‘popular’ front against the 
Fascist threat.6 In France the first of the Popular Front governments took power under 
the leadership of Léon Blum in 1934. Though suspicious of the suddenly cordial 
Communists, the new government succeeded in seeing off an overblown threat from 
French Fascists and providing an example for leftists across Europe.
In February of 1936, as we will see in Chapter 3, the leftist parties in Spain 
formed a Popular Front similar to that of their French comrades and won a significant 
majority in the Cortes, Spain’s legislature. For several months, tensions around the 
country simmered as rightist factions weighed their options. A sputtering rebellion by 
the potential insurgents might have, in a sense, vaccinated the Republic against 
further unrest but the political right still felt too weak to risk a coup and so tensions 
continued to mount.7 Those strains erupted in a wave of church burnings which 
destabilized Madrid and its southern environs. The government acted tardily in 
suppressing the attacks and youth organizations of the left and right began street 
fighting. Political killings immediately followed.
On July 13, 1936, several Socialists and sympathetic members of the Assault 
Guards, a paramilitary unit created by the Republic as a counterweight to the 
5
 See Jonathan Haslam, “The Comintern and the Origins of the Popular Front 1934-1935,” The 
Historical Journal, 22:3 (September 1979): 673-691. Haslam offers an interesting perspective on the 
manner in which the national parties outside of the Soviet Union contributed to the eventual 
formulation of the Popular Front strategy. He maintains that Moscow retained final decision on the 
subject but clarifies some of the program’s origins in France, Austria, and Spain. 
6
 For information on the ‘Popular Front’ see: Helen Graham and Paul Preston, eds., The Popular Front 
in Europe (St. Martin’s Press: NY 1987), François Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of 
Communism in the Twentieth Century (University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1997, and Martin S. 
Alexander and Helen Graham, The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative Perspectives
(Cambridge University Press: NY 1989). 
7
 Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain: The Experience of Civil War (Penguin: London 1979), 90
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traditional Guardia Civil, kidnapped and murdered the monarchist parliamentary 
leader Calvo Sotello. While arguably a response to the earlier murder of an Assault 
Guards lieutenant, the assassination pushed forward the timetable of a conspiracy 
previously organized by monarchists, military officers, and various right-wing 
politicians. Four days later, on the evening of the 17th, the military rose against the 
Republic in the provincial city of Melilla in Morocco.8
The next day officers and troops in the major peninsular garrisons also rose 
and quickly seized power in the cities of Cadiz, Granada, Burgos, and Seville as well 
as large rural regions. Police, Assault Guards, and, in some cases, Guardia Civil
combined with militant workers to suppress the mutiny in the industrialized regions 
of the country including Madrid, Catalonia, and Valencia. When sailors mutinied 
against their rebellious officers, the insurgents lost command of the navy and were 
thus unable to link their initial gains in Spain with their base in Morocco. With the its 
most powerful combat units, the Army of Africa, blockaded in Morocco and the 
industrial centers outside its control, the rising seemed destined to fail.
Within days, however, aid arrived from Italy and Germany in the form of nine 
transport aircraft which began history’s first airlift, ferrying troops over the Straits of 
Gibraltar.9 These forces had immediate impact and the insurgents began driving on 
Madrid, Teruel, and the supply lines around the capital. The democracies, as will be 
seen in Chapter 2, chose to avoid confronting the Fascist powers and attempted to 
8
 For information on the military rising and the military conduct of the war see: Blood of Spain, Paul 
Preston, Franco: A Biography (Basic Books: NY 1994), Michael Alpert, A New International History 
of the Spanish Civil War (St. Martin’s Press: NY 1994), and Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War: 
Revolution and Counterrevolution (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill 1991). 
9
 Mussolini originally sent 12 plans but three crash landed in French Algeria and were discovered 
immediately.
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isolate Spain by implementing a “Non-Intervention Pact” overseen by a toothless and 
ineffective Non-Intervention Committee based in London. While virtually every 
nation in Europe signed on to the agreement and the United States agreed in principle, 
Hitler and Mussolini continued to supply the rightist uprising.
German and Italian aid increased in the early fall and seriously improved the 
strategic situation for the insurgents who, having chosen Franco as commander-in-
chief in late September, were within miles of the capital. In October, however, Josef 
Stalin and the Soviet leadership decided to intervene, unofficially, on the side of the 
Republic. Sending munitions and food to Madrid in exchange for Spanish gold, the 
Soviet Union attempted to counter the intervention of the Fascist dictators. The 
Comintern also aided the Republic by recruiting, equipping, and training the famed 
International Brigades which first appeared in combat as the Moors and Foreign 
Legion reached the gates of Madrid. With the arrival of the brigadistas and the 
commencement of Soviet support, the Republican resistance stabilized and the 
conflict ground into a war of attrition which would continue until April of 1939. 
Having described the basic course of the conflict it is important to discuss the 
terminology to be used in naming the combatants. During the war those favoring 
Franco, who established his capital in Burgos, described his forces as Nationalists, 
patriots, or insurgents while labeling the government forces as reds, Communists, 
Bolsheviks, radicals, or leftists. Those supporting the government in Madrid referred 
to the forces they backed as Loyalists, Republicans, patriots, and democrats while 
describing their opponents as Fascists, Francoists, rebels, reactionaries, and 
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militarists. The phrases used in describing each side are a sensitive issue given that 
each name has historic, often negative, connotations. This paper will confront the 
difficulty by following the lead of one of the foremost scholars in the field, Paul 
Preston, who refers to the forces of Burgos as ‘Nationalists’ and those of Madrid as 
‘Republican’. 
The term ‘Nationalist’ is most appropriate because the forces supporting 
Franco were not originally Fascist or revolutionary in nature. They were, in fact, the 
traditional monarchist, Catholic, and conservative interests which had ruled Spain for 
centuries and which saw his movement as a counterbalance to the radical left. 
‘Republican’ is virtually the only label suitable for those fighting for Madrid as the 
need to maintain the Republic, at least in the short-term, was the only principle 
holding Communists, Socialists, Anarcho-Syndicalists, Basques, Catalan Nationalists, 
and liberals together in an alliance. While occasionally confusing (Basque nationalists 
fought for the Republic) these terms will be used as consistently as the dictates of 
readability and precision allow.
Many individuals outside of Spain were electrified by the fact that the war 
appeared to pit Communists against Fascists, Catholics against atheists, and 
democrats against totalitarians. While these impressions certainly found some 
substance in the reality of the war, the conflict was primarily local. Much as 
nationalism became confused with Communism during the cold war, the ideologies 
which international observers saw motivating the conflict were not the actual roots of 
the conflict. British historian Ronald Fraser, along with the majority of the field, 
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identifies land ownership, the role of the Church in education, Basque and Catalan 
nationalism, Anarcho-syndicalist agitation, economic stagnation, and the frustrations 
of the army as the prime ‘points of rupture’ in pre-war Spain.10 The international 
public however, did not comprehend such niceties in 1936 and the perceived conflicts 
mentioned above drove them to choose for the Nationalists or Republicans. The 
esoteric and negative nature of that international support is the basis of this 
investigation.
In 1937, after the first full year of the conflict, the newly founded Gallup Poll 
asked Americans to rate the ten events of the past twelve months which “interested 
you most.” The population as a whole did not even place the war on the list and for 
male respondents it slipped in only at number ten (immediately after the Windsor 
Marriage). 11 Two weeks later a full sixty-six percent of Americans were either 
unaware of the conflict or did not feel strongly either way.12 Even in the following 
year the war still did not figure into the most interesting events for Americans.13
British polls did not begin until 1938 but in that year a relatively respectable sixty-
seven percent of the population held an opinion.14 While the British public clearly 
followed the war more closely than Americans, this is unsurprising given the relative 
proximity of Britain to Spain, the nations’ historic connections, Britain’s base at 
Gibraltar, and the general tension in Europe. Given these national interests, the fact 
10 Blood of Spain, 513.
11 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (Random House: NY 1972), 80.
12 Ibid., 80.
13
 “American Institute of Public Opinion Surveys,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 3:4 (October 1939), 
603.
14
 Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton University Press: Princeton 1951), 808.
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that a full third of the public in the United Kingdom held no opinion is as surprising 
as America’s underwhelming apathy.15
That disinterestedness, however common, was certainly not universal. For 
many, the Spanish Civil War was the event of the 1930s and a central feature of their 
emotional and political lives. Simply listing titles of the secondary literature conveys 
some sense of the war’s effect: Blood of Spain, The Last Great Cause, Spanish 
Tragedy, The Wound in the Heart, Today the Struggle, The Passionate War. The 
following chapters will detail the efforts of those involved in supporting both the 
Nationalists and the Republicans. Those groups acted in Spain not because of the 
local concerns which ignited the conflict but rather because they saw the war in Spain 
as analogous to their own struggles at home. The blows being struck in Spain were 
blows for left and right-wing activists everywhere. While the majority of the public 
may not have been watching, the eyes of Catholics, Communists, Progressives, and 
others were riveted on Spain.
15
 For more information on American apathy see Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the 
Spanish Civil War (Indiana University Press: Bloomington 1968), 106-108.
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The Case for Burgos
The idyllic scenes of trout fishing, fiestas, and bull fights described in Ernest 
Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises provide a fair representation of Spain in the eyes of 
most Americans (and many Europeans) during the early inter-war years.1 Seen as a 
quaint and romantic backwater of Europe, studded with ancient castles, monasteries, 
and churches, Spain merited little attention from a world absorbed in the Roaring 
Twenties and the Great Depression. Because of its apparent unimportance, few 
newspapers or radio networks maintained correspondents in Spain, relying instead on 
a scattered handful of independent journalists and the wire services. Newsreel 
companies, the infants of the media business, covered Spain only infrequently and, 
when presenting the nation to their viewers, focused primarily on its scenic views and 
political instability.2
For these reasons the beginning of the Civil War on July 17, caught the 
international press unprepared. Newspapers reacted by interviewing diplomats and 
businessmen who had even a vague familiarity with the country while hastily 
dispatching journalists to Madrid. The lack of an independent press at the outbreak of 
hostilities meant that vague and anecdotal reports provided by tourists and 
1
 For relatively balanced American views on Spain during the interwar years see Hemingway’s works 
as well as Matthew Josephson’s memoirs, Infidel in the Temple (Alfred Knopf: New York, 1967) and 
former US ambassador Claude G. Bowers’ My Mission to Spain (Simon and Schuster: New York, 
1954). For a contemporaneous academic perspective read The Spanish Tragedy, 1930-1936: 
Dictatorship, Republic, Chaos by E. Allison Peers (Oxford University Press, 1936).
2
 Anthony Aldgate, Cinema and History: British Newsreels and the Spanish Civil War (London: Scolar 
Press, 1979), 102. In addition to patchy coverage, the reporting itself was often less than professional. 
British viewers were treated to a newsreel in which “President Manuel Azana Diego Martinez Barrio” 
reviewed a parade of troops. In fact, Manuel Azana would not be elected President until seven days 
after the release of the newsreel and Diego Martinez Barrio was the Speaker of the Cortes. 
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businessmen who happened to witness “revolutionary incidents” constituted the bulk 
of “news” about the conflict available to the outside world. Dispatches quickly 
improved as professional journalists arrived in Spain and began trying to objectively 
sketch the scene for their audiences back home. As information filtered in, foreign 
opinion and policy began to coalesce and in several constituencies that opinion came 
to favor the Nationalist forces commanded by Francisco Franco.3
The first nations to take any positions in the new conflict were the Fascist 
powers- Italy and Germany.4 The two dictators in charge of these countries did not 
need to consult public opinion or a divided government, and within days of the 
rebellion German and Italian planes were flying the Army of Africa, Spain’s elite 
corps of Moors and Foreign Legionnaires, over the Straits of Gibraltar and into 
combat with Republican forces. As the war progressed, Mussolini dispatched an 
entire army corps to the Iberian Peninsula as well as large portions of the Italian Air 
Force. Hitler’s Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht contributed men, weapons, and expertise to 
Franco’s infant air force but did not participate heavily in ground combat. Both 
nations opened their armories to the Nationalists and extended large lines of credit to 
Franco’s regime despite the theoretical restrictions imposed by the Non-Intervention 
Committee.5
3
 Originally Franco was not intended to lead the rebelling forces but a series of accidents resulted in the 
death or capture of several more senior officers while Franco’s influence with Germany and position in 
the army (particularly with the Foreign Legion) cemented his position at the head of the Nationalists.
4
 For information regarding the entry of Italy and Germany see A New International History of the 
Spanish Civil War by Michael Alpert (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1994 as well as chapter XV of 
Paul Preston’s definitive Franco: A Biography (Basic Books: New York, 1994).
5
 Norman J. Padelford analyzes the many shortcomings of the Committee’s agreements in his article 
“The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil War,” The American Journal of 
International Law, 31:4 (October, 1937): 578-603.
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Britain and France reacted more cautiously to the Spanish Crisis.6 Reports 
indicate that the Popular Front government in France originally intended to sell arms 
and supplies to Madrid but changed course following consultations with Britain. In 
these talks, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden reminded Prime Minister Blum about 
German troop movements along the Rhine and the danger of provoking an 
international conflict.7 Following such subtle British threats to leave France alone in 
the face of a Continental war, Blum’s government proposed an arms embargo out of 
which was born the Non-Intervention Committee. After quick negotiation, all the 
major European powers agreed to Non-Intervention along with twenty three of the 
smaller states.8 While officially a perfectly impartial act, the decision to prevent the 
importation of arms dramatically weakened the position of the Republican 
government, which did not have a regular army to compete with the rebels or, as yet, 
a powerful and cynical patron willing to flout the Committee’s restrictions. To this 
6
 Preston’s Franco offers excellent insight into the reactions of these two nations. Enrique Moradiellos 
provides a well-researched explanation of British policy towards Franco in “The Gentle General” in 
Paul Preston and Ann L. Mackenzie, eds., The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936-1939
(Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 1996). For a cynical and condemnatory analysis of British 
policy read Britain, Italy, Germany, and the Spanish Civil War by Will Podmore (Edwin Mellen 
Press:Lewiston, NY, 1998). Anthony Eden’s memoirs Facing the Dictators (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 
1962) includes primary source analysis of Britain’s policy.
7
 Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 1968) 34.
8
 Traina, 38. Salazar’s Portugal initially refused to join the embargo, which would have rendered the 
plan stillborn. Following serious pressure from London, however, the Portuguese saw the benefits of 
joining and agreed to the embargo though they thumbed their noses at Britain by refusing to attend the 
first meeting of the Committee.
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extent, Britain and France9 can be placed in the same pro-Nationalist camp as 
Germany and Italy.10
Their effective support of the Nationalists, though always cloaked in Non-
Intervention, did not especially trouble the democracies in the early years of the war. 
An analysis of British Foreign Office records indicates that despite the Falangist 
influence on the rebellion, “it seemed clear [to London] that this Nazi-Fascist help 
was in no way modifying the nature of the insurgent camp.”11 The British believed, 
until late in the war, that Franco was simply the latest in a long line of secular military 
dictators who periodically stepped in to “protect” the Spanish state. While missing the 
rapid move towards Fascism within the Nationalist organization, the democracies also 
assumed that the Nationalists would be more friendly to private business interests 
than their Republican adversaries. Surprisingly, however, the Nationalists were 
probably more protectionist than the “Reds” whom they were fighting given that ,“the 
advocacy of free trade- to make possible cheaper food for the working classes… was 
standard on the platforms of most Republican parties.”12 In the general fear of 
9
 For a brief period in 1938 France reopened its borders with Republican Spain but this window 
quickly shut with a string of Nationalist victories in the North and the reversal of French policy in the 
fall. Britain remained the strongest proponent of Non-Intervention throughout the conflict, going so far 
as to prevent the Republican navy from using port facilities at Gibraltar in its blockade of the Straits.
10
 For information regarding the negative impact of the embargo on the Republican war effort see 
Douglas Little, Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Spanish 
Civil War (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1985).
11
 Enrique Moradiellos, “The Gentle General: The Official British Perception of General Franco 
During the Spanish Civil War, “ in Ann L. Mackenzie and Paul Preston, eds., The Republic Besieged: 
Civil War in Spain, 1936-1939 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 12.
12
 Shlomo Ben-Ami, “The Republican ‘take-over’: Prelude to Inevitable Catastrophe?” in Paul Preston, 
ed., Revolution and War in Spain, 1936-1939 (New York: Methuen & Co., 1984), 17-18.
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Communism, such subtle positions went unnoticed and the democracies remained 
anti-Republican for virtually the entire conflict.13
Official American reaction to the War was largely pre-determined.14 The year 
before, Congress passed the landmark Neutrality Act of 1935 which effectively tied 
the hands of the State Department and preemptively announced America’s position in 
any foreign crisis to the rest of the world. This legislation proved inadequate in the 
new conflict, however, as the Act referred only to wars “between or among nations” 
and not to civil conflicts.15 To resolve this difficulty President Roosevelt requested 
that the legislature revisit the issue and, on January 6, 1937, with a unanimous vote in 
the Senate and a 406 to 1 vote in the House, the Neutrality Act was amended to 
prohibit the sale of armaments or raw materials to any parties engaged in military 
action. From this point on, the continued enforcement of the embargo became the 
prime objective of Nationalist sympathizers in the United States.
The most vociferous of these groups was the Roman Catholic Church.16 While 
the Church had legally existed in the colonies since the grant of Maryland’s charter in 
1632, it was not until the early twentieth century that Catholicism became socially 
13
 For an explanation of American obsession with Anti-Communism during the interwar years, see 
Douglas Little’s “Anti-Bolshevism and American Foreign Policy, 1919-1939: The Diplomacy of Self-
Delusion,” American Quarterly, 35:4 (Autumn, 1983): 376-390. 
14
 A former United States ambassador to Spain offers an intriguing view of American policy in Carlton 
Hayes, The United States and Spain: An Interpretation (Sheed & Ward: New York, 1951).
15
 Phillip C. Jessup, “The Spanish Rebellion and International Law,” Foreign Affaris 15:1/4  (January 
1937): 263. Professor Jessup continues in a fascinating discussion of the legal principles surrounding 
the recognition of belligerent status, the recognition of a government, and the blurry boundaries 
between disturbances, insurrections, rebellions, and revolutions. He concludes that law and precedence 
did not justify any intervention in Spain at the time.
16
 For an excellent analysis of American Catholic opinion regarding the Spanish Civil war see J. David 
Valaik, “Catholics, Neutrality, and the Spanish Civil War, 1937-1939,” The Journal of American 
History 54:1 (June 1967): 73-85 as well as Donald F. Crosby’s “Boston’s Catholics and the Spanish 
Civil War: 1936-1939,” The New England Quarterly 44:1 (March, 1971): 82-100.
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accepted in Anglo-Saxon America. Before that time “Nativist” parties had decried the 
influence of “popery” in the United States and convents were regarded with suspicion 
and disgust. Even in the 1930s Catholics still faced discrimination though in heavily 
Irish cities such as New York, Boston, and Chicago it was possible for them to hold 
positions of power. 17 Al Smith, a Catholic, even mounted a Presidential campaign in 
1928. In 1936 Catholics made up a substantial portion of the population, numbering 
around twenty million, and had begun to amass considerable political power, in part 
due to the mistaken impression among Protestants that they represented a monolithic 
mass.18
That mass appeared squarely behind the Franco government when the Civil 
War began. Catholics were instrumental in the campaign to promote Franco’s image 
in the United States with leaders of the National Catholic Welfare Conference 
(NCWC) taking charge of public relations for the general.19 As will be seen, the 
Catholic Press began churning out leaflets, periodicals, and books all praising the 
Nationalist cause and extolling the personal virtues of the Caudillo.20 Catholic 
newspapers engaged in debates with their secular and Protestant competitors, arguing 
that the non-Catholic press was biased and misinformed about events in Spain. A 
representative headline from the Archdiocesan paper in Boston reads:
17
 Boston College was forced to found its Law School in 1926 because of the difficulties experienced 
by Irish Catholics in gaining admittance to the legal profession. 
18
 Valaik, 84. See also: McGreevy, John T., “Thinking on One’s Own: Catholicism in the American 
Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960,” The Journal of American History 84:1 (June 1997): 97-131. for a 
discussion of the mistaken impressions of Protestant thinkers and John P. Diggins, “American 
Catholics and Italian Fascism,” Journal of Contemporary History 2:4 (October 1967): 51-68. for 
perspectives on American Catholic political allegiances.
19
 Traina, 193, argues that this was the most important task facing the pro-Nationalists, and perhaps the 
one in which Spanish officials helped their supporters the least. See Crosby, “Boston’s Catholics” for 
an excellent account of NCWC efforts throughout the war.
20
 For a particularly fawning example see: Georges Rotvand, Franco Means Business (Devin-Adair: 
New York, n.d.). From textual analysis it appears the book appeared some time in the spring of 1937, 
early enough in the conflict to significantly affect public opinion.
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Condemns Secular Reports of Spanish War Crisis 
Catholic Editor Charges Sins of Omission and Commission21
The body of the article continued to dispute allegations of a Nationalist atrocity and 
claimed that, “hundreds of similar instances of distortion, exaggeration, and 
misrepresentation could be given.”22 This sort of article speaks to the fear among 
American Catholics that Protestant journalists were slandering their co-religionists in 
Spain.
Catholic organizations acted in more concrete ways by vigorously lobbying 
their representatives in Congress. As part of the campaign to keep the embargo, the 
NCWC organized a petition with over 1,750,000 signatures which was delivered to 
Congress along with letters from influential Catholics.23 The “Keep the Spanish 
Embargo Committee,” founded in 1938, boasted over four million members from 
twenty of the most influential Catholic organizations in the nation. This organization, 
along with similarly interested groups, managed to prevent pro-Republican factions 
from removing the embargo and possibly resuscitating the fortunes of the Republic.
Catholics also mobilized against issues that Washington policy makers 
believed to be less explosive than the embargo question. In April of 1937, the public 
learned of a Red Cross plan to ship five hundred refugee children to the United 
States.24 Unfortunately for these children, their parents were Basque Catholics who 
fought for the Republic, making them the darlings of the international Republican 
movement and important propaganda symbols. In addition to being a potential public 
21
 “Condemns Secular Reports of Spanish War Crisis,” The Pilot, 3 July 1937, 1. Incidentally, the 
report of an atrocity at Badajoz proved to be accurate though the magnitude of the killing was less than 
originally reported.
22
 Ibid., 1.
23
 Valaik, 80.
24
 Crosby, “Boston’s Catholics” includes a lengthy discussion of Cardinal O’Connor’s reaction to the 
program.
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relations embarrassment, the proposal reminded American Catholics of a similar 
effort to relocate Basque children in England. In that experiment, several thousand 
children were shipped to temporary camps in the British countryside before 
placement in private homes. The fact that some of the homes happened to be 
Protestant was an affront to Catholic pride and led many to believe that the program 
amounted to little more than cloaked evangelism.25 When Nationalist forces overran 
and ‘pacified’ the regions from which the children had been evacuated, Republican 
sympathizers in Britain obstructed their repatriation, ostensibly for humanitarian 
reasons. The American committee organized to oversee the transport and settlement 
of the children failed to address concerns raised by the British experience and 
neglected to include any prominent Catholics among its members. Following the 
refusal of Catholics to accept the organization and its leadership, the program was 
quickly scuttled, leaving several hundred Basque children in danger of starvation.
Perhaps more tragically, the Catholic lobby also intervened in another 
purportedly humanitarian mission in 1938.26 During the summer of that year the State 
Department approached the American Red Cross with the information that 
Republican Spain was likely to experience a massive grain shortage during the 
coming winter. Working with the Department of Agriculture and the (Republican) 
25
 “Despoliation,” The Pilot, 14 August 1937, 4. bemoans the spiritual condition of the Basque children 
in England. The author referred to reports that only twenty of 350 children attended Mass in the weeks 
after their departure from Spain. Attempting to explain this, “poor showing”, the author proposed that, 
“the children may not have been told in time or they may have been at a loss in a foreign land they did 
not understand.” Eventually the author concluded with the improbable assertion that the children 
lapsed from their religion not because of any anti-Catholic feeling in the Basque country but because 
of a fear to express their faith resulting from the atrocities they must have seen committed against their 
fellow Catholics in Spain.
26
 Traina, 200-202 relates the story succinctly. A slightly different set of figures appears in, “Extra U.S. 
Wheat Will Go to Spain,” The New York Times, 22 December 1938, 1. Traina does not include much 
of the detail and political analysis present in the Times article but it is likely that his figures, compiled 
in the course of historical research rather than journalistic investigation, are more accurate. For this 
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Spanish Ambassador, the Red Cross discovered that the Federal Surplus 
Commodities Commission had in its possession 250,000 barrels of flour that it was 
willing to donate to the cause along with the promise of 100,000 barrels a month to 
follow. Furthermore, the United States Maritime Commission agreed to ship the flour 
gratis in unused cargo space to Bordeaux or Le Havre where it would be received by 
the American Friends Service Committee for free transport to Spain.27 To avoid the 
appearance of partiality, exactly half of the barrels were to be allocated to each of the 
warring regions despite the fact that the Nationalist regime was actually known to 
enjoy a wheat surplus during 1938. Roosevelt was accused of starting the program 
merely as an attempt to keep the Republican government alive through the winter, 
part of “a steady stiffening United States attitude toward totalitarian powers.”28 An 
intensive letter writing campaign and a fundraising failure eventually brought a halt to 
the flour donation after only 60,000 barrels were shipped.
American Catholics’ ability to influence foreign policy indicates both the 
strength of their organization and their political importance within the United States. 
It does not seem immediately obvious, however, that an organization comprised 
largely of Irish and Italian immigrants would feel so strongly about events in Spain 
but the propaganda aimed at Catholics worked very effectively. This publicity 
campaign organized by the Church worked through three main channels, the pulpit, 
the radio, and the press.
27
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In the 1930s every Catholic theoretically attended Mass weekly and on the 
Holy Days of Obligation. At each of these Masses the parish priest delivered a homily 
on a topic of his own choosing and read dispatches from the Church hierarchy. 
Encyclicals from Pius XI as well as letters from the archbishops and cardinals served 
to inform and exhort Catholics about their duties in the world. Special collections and 
petition drives were other means by which the parish priest might educate and engage 
his congregation. The experience of Mass, shared by Catholics around the globe, was 
an important tool of the Church in encouraging an emotional connection between 
American Catholics and their Spanish co-religionists. This connection was later used 
to motivate the grassroots political pressure already seen in the termination of wheat 
shipments and the retention of the arms embargo.
The 1930s also witnessed the novel phenomenon of the “radio priest,” typified 
by the outspoken Father Charles E. Coughlin of Detroit.29 Described alternately as a 
saint and a proto-fascist, Coughlin’s weekly addresses reached over eight million 
homes in 1938, which was not even the peak of his popularity.30 During holidays, 
such as Christmas of 1939, Coughlin could be heard on the radios of over fifteen 
million Americans.31 Not all of Coughlin’s listeners were Catholic or even religious, 
29
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but the large majority were and, according to a Gallup poll, over 80 percent of his 
audience approved of his messages.32
On January 15, 1939, rather late in the conflict, Coughlin devoted an entire 
program to discussion of the embargo question. The priest had earlier touched on the 
subject but this address was his first major treatment of the war. He informed his 
listeners that no fewer than 200 groups supporting “Loyalists-Communists” were 
actively lobbying in Washington to remove the embargo. Calling Franco “a rebel for 
Christ, a rebel for humanity’s sake” the priest blamed the Republicans for the 
destruction of every church and chapel in their territory, the murder of 12,500 
religious (surprisingly close to an accurate number), and 300,000 women and 
children. If one includes the eight million subscribers to Coughlin’s magazine with 
his then three million listeners, this speech explains some of the power behind the 
lobbying campaign which Catholics brought to bear on Congress.33
The Catholic Press is the most historically accessible means by which the 
Church reached its members.34 In the 1930s every archdiocese in the nation published 
its own newspaper, a copy of which was delivered weekly to the vast majority of 
Catholic homes. The diocesan newspaper was often the primary source for news for 
members of the older generations.35 Two major national publications, the Jesuit 
32
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magazine America and the more liberal Commonweal, supplemented the diocesan 
newspaper and offered more analytical essays on the war and politics.36 The Catholic 
Press provided the devout with information and opinions which they considered to 
objective and theologically safe. 
Aside from Fr. Coughlin’s fiery orations, Catholic propaganda regarding the 
Spanish Civil War was primarily reactionary. The speakers on weekly radio programs 
(whose transcripts were published weekly by the Catholic Press) and authors for the 
Catholic press generally sought to redress what they considered misperceptions of the 
war in Spain. Their main concerns were with a perception of the Nationalists as 
aggressors, the belief that the Church and Francoists were anti-democratic, and the 
assertions that the Catholic Church oppressed the Spanish peasants and dominated 
Spanish life.
To counter the Republican argument that war guilt rests with Franco due to 
the army’s attempted coup of July 17th, the proximate cause of the war, the Catholic 
hierarchy pointed to the persecution of the Church under the Republic. In articles 
published throughout 1936, including some written before the rebellion, The Pilot
described “Churches, convents, monasteries, religious schools, and private chapels 
[going] up in flames in one of the most tremendous holocausts of religious edi[fi]ces 
known in history.”37 American Catholics were also graphically told of the 
disinterment of bodies in religious cemeteries, the killing of priests and bishops, the 
it seems that the paper was geared primarily to an audience consisting of married women, retired men, 
and the Knights of Columbus.
36
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rape and murder of nuns, and the desecration of religious artifacts. Americans also 
reacted strongly to news about the suppression of the Jesuits; the curtailment of 
religious education; and the confiscation of Church lands, buildings, and 
endowments. 
In the United States and abroad, Republicans argued that their opponents, the 
Nationalists and the Catholic Church, were anti-democratic and frankly Fascist in 
nature. This charge could have badly damaged opinion in the Irish Catholic 
community which was just beginning to taste political power and which still bore 
many memories of anti-Catholic bias in Ireland. Representative government was seen 
as a bulwark against such discrimination and Irish Catholics would be unlikely to 
support a regime believed to be anti-democratic. The Church refuted such claims by 
arguing that an erroneous impression had been created. William Montavon, an officer 
in the NCWC and a leading American Catholic, corresponded frequently with 
Nationalist officials and responded indignantly to their critics:
My own personal knowledge of Spanish conditions, acquired through 
personal contacts extending over a period of years leaves no doubt in my mind 
but that men like Gil Robles [head of CEDA, a conservative Catholic party] 
and even General Franco, who is Commander-in-Chief of the opposition in 
the present civil war, are sincerely of the conviction that a republic is the most 
desirable form of government for Spain. The civil war in Spain is not due to 
any opposition to a republican form of government, but to abuses which were 
rapidly leading to chaos in Spain under a form of government which was in no 
sense democratic or republican.38
Catholic writers continued to argue that the republic had been “in no sense 
democratic” by analyzing its electoral system, which granted victory to an entire 
38
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ticket if a single parliamentary candidate won over 80 percent of the popular vote.39
This measure had been designed to create stable majorities in the parliament but 
opposition to it caused widespread frustration and alleged election boycotts.  The 
Pilot observed that, “this does not look like a ‘properly elected government,’ not at 
least as we Americans understand that term.”40 By impugning the credibility of the 
Madrid government the Catholic press hoped to establish Franco’s regime as a 
palatable alternative. 
This effort was hamstrung somewhat by Franco’s refusal to bow to foreign 
sensibilities; many of his statements were less than helpful in courting international 
public opinion.41 An excerpt from Franco’s address following his proclamation as 
head of state in 1936 included a passage that read in part, “We do not believe in 
government through voting booths. The Spanish national will was never freely 
expressed through the ballot box.”42 Statements such as these, though accompanied 
by denunciations of the political corruption which surrounded previous Spanish 
elections, seriously damaged the effectiveness of pro-Nationalist propaganda.
The final concern of the Catholic Church was its image as an oppressor of the 
Spanish peasantry and proletariat. Detractors claimed that the Church owned up to 
one third of the arable land in Spain and that the cost of supporting the hierarchy was 
breaking the backs of the landless poor. In defense of the Spanish clergy, American 
Catholics were told that, “Catholics in Spain certainly did not seek any property rights 
39
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or authority which in the United States would be held to be excessive.”43
Additionally, the American hierarchy went to great lengths to explain that the Spanish 
Church did not in fact possess massive sums of money and that those funds it did 
administer were for the provision of public services such as hospitals, schools, and 
universities. The unwavering faith and support of Spanish Catholics was also 
highlighted as evidence that the Church was not oppressive. In an open letter to 
diocesan newspapers, William Montavon claimed that, “when it became apparent that 
[the Republicans] were bent on uprooting religion, Spanish Catholics in great 
numbers and with the approval of their priests, joined in the ranks of the Nationalists 
in defense of the Church.”44
The hierarchy attempted to motivate its members through emotional outrage, 
recall the continuous horror stories splashed across the pages of the Catholic press, 
and through comparison between America and Spain. In responding to criticisms that 
Spain was overrun with churches and chapels a radio priest responded by noting that:
There was one Methodist church in the U.S. for every 211 Methodists; one 
Presbyterian Church in North America for every 148 Presbyterians; but only 
one church for every 874 Catholics in Spain. For comparison it will be well to 
remember that… [in the US the ratio is] one for every 1097 Catholics.45
While the numbers given appear to support the priest’s claim, it should be noted that 
the geographical frame of reference switches from the United States to North 
America, altering the sample significantly. The figure on Catholic Churches in 
America is also puzzling because, assuming the United States was properly served, 
Spain would appear over-burdened. The Spanish figure itself is misleading as it 
43
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includes only “chapels and churches” but does not account for Spain’s particularly 
numerous monasteries and convents. In this same address, the priest responded to 
allegations that the Church in Spain received a large portion of its funding from a tax 
collected by the state, arguing that, “it is part of the general taxation, much as the 
school tax is American cities is included in the general tax rate.”46 This analogy 
cannot be dismissed immediately as Catholic parishes provided schools in much the 
same manner as an American school district. The Spanish tax, however, amounted to 
forced tithing, a practice with which few Americans would agree. Other authors made 
comparisons between the Spanish Church and Anglo-American examples, correlating 
the governmental role of the Church in Spain with that of the Church of England, 
equating Spanish rioters of 1931 with Boston strikers of 1919, and the likening the 
holdings of religious orders with the endowment of Harvard University. While the 
appropriateness of the analogies must often be questioned, the intention of the writers 
was clearly to make American Catholics sympathize with their Spanish brethren.
These comparisons generally bear favorably on the role of the Church in 
Spain and often serve to clarify legitimate misconceptions. On occasion, however, the 
attempted explanations serve to condemn the Church, if only in hindsight. While 
attempting to explain away Spain’s illiteracy rate of over 45 percent (incidentally 
congratulating the Church on bringing it down from 75 percent half a century earlier 
despite the fact that education was under Church control at both points) an 
unidentified radio priest drew an analogy with the American South:
No one would be justified in pointing to this high percentage of negro 
illiteracy and saying that it was due to the desire of the American people to 
keep the negro in ignorance, overlooking all the other possible and actual 
46
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factors. Similarly, no one is justified in citing the high percentage of Spanish 
illiteracy as proof that the Catholic Church wished to keep the Spanish peasant 
ignorant and did nothing to help him to acquire an education, overlooking the 
political and economic causes of this illiteracy.47
Today few would argue that “negro illiteracy” was not an intentional result of 
Southerner’s desire to exercise control over former slaves. The priest cannot have 
recognized this analogy as a condemnation of his Church’s role in Spain but such 
remarks do point to American’s real ignorance of the situation in Spain (not to 
mention their own country) and the socially accepted racism of the era. 
American isolationists and pacifists represent the second group of major 
importance in the pro-Nationalist camp. These were two potent political movements,
at times virtually indistinguishable from one another, whose ideas held currency from 
George Washington’s farewell address to the twentieth century. In the 1920s and 30s 
they were both particularly popular and exercised their influence by securing the 
defeat of the Versailles treaty, preventing American participation in the League of 
Nations, engineering the Neutrality Act of 1935, and spearheading the international 
disarmament movement.48 Pacifism grew so strong that by 1935 a large grassroots 
movement had sprouted which demanded that the Constitution be amended to require 
a plebiscite before Congress could declare war.49
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The isolationists became pro-Nationalists for two reasons. Their support of 
Non-Intervention made them at the very least anti-Republican, which, in such a 
polarized environment amounted to support for Franco. In this position, the American 
isolationists found themselves in the novel position of supporting French and British 
foreign policy. Secondly, most American isolationists were also strong nationalists of 
the conservative variety. In much the same manner as Catholics, their fervent anti-
communism disposed them to support the Spanish Nationalists, especially if this fit 
their autarkic philosophies.50
Interestingly, the isolationist lobby achieved most of its objectives in the 
Spanish Civil War well before the conflict began. In an excellent analysis of the 
European diplomatic climate leading up to the non-intervention decision, Richard 
Traina argues that, “The European democracies would be highly unlikely to permit 
American initiative in Europe for fear that the Americans would back out and leave 
them alone to face any resulting crisis. During the Spanish Civil War the British made 
their feelings on this point quite clear.”51 Since the overriding objective of the 
isolationist policy was to prevent “foreign adventures” it appears that their 
obstructionist work in the 1920s and 30s effectively prevented such adventures from 
occurring in the future.52 Additionally, the Neutrality Act of 1935 committed the 
United States to the embargo even before Britain suggested it and, as the war 
Civil War had on American attitudes towards a European war. The House of Representatives 
determined not to abrogate its power to declare war by voting down the Ludlow Amendment, as the act 
was labeled, by a mere twenty-one votes.
50
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continued, isolationists such as the influential Senator Gerald Nye used all their 
political skills to keep the embargo in place. As we will see, they enjoyed several 
distinct advantages over their adversaries in the pro-Republican camp which led to 
the continuation of the embargo.53
The isolationist message was delivered through the political organizations set 
up over the preceding decades.54 The regular party organizations played an important 
role in drumming up popular support and developing a substantial literature on the 
subject. Often these were books published by travelers in Spain who claimed to have 
witnessed the horrors of war and wished to save their country from the same fate. 
These generally included somber warnings of impending “Red” contamination and 
prescriptions for its avoidance.
America Look at Spain, by Merwin Hart, is probably the most widely known 
and cited book of this genre.55 The author described himself as a concerned citizen 
whose interest had been piqued by the propaganda of the Communist International. 
He related his travels through Nationalist Spain (he believed that a trip through the 
Republic would be superfluous) and attempted to debunk the myths surrounding the 
Madrid government’s war effort which he believed obscured the Republicans’ 
essentially anarchist and communist nature. Hart established his isolationist 
credentials by pragmatically arguing that the best policy was, “let the Germans have 
their Nazism in Germany, if they wish; let the Italians have their Fascism. But let us 
53
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Americans preserve our democratic Republic for ourselves.”56 The avowed purposes 
of the book were to illustrate the parallels between the United States and Spain, to 
warn Americans of the Comintern’s intention to draw their nation into the Civil War, 
and to call attention to dangers of Communist agitators in America. After 
“objectively” describing the situation in Spain and exposing as false the “Red 
propaganda” which he saw flooding the United States, Hart warns that were America 
to join any European war, “we would unquestionably emerge under the control of a 
dictator.”57
These sorts of works operated by convincing people of beliefs and fears they 
already held. The Dies Committee, forerunner of Senator McCarthy’s Committees, 
and the intermittent Red scares worried many Americans that subversive elements
might be present in their own neighborhoods. The books written by the isolationist, 
American-nationalist camp played on this fear by explaining how the Comintern in 
Spain quickly captured control of the Republic through its operatives already in place. 
Isolationists struck a second chord by reawakening American memories of the First 
World War. In the 1920s and 30s many Americans became convinced that the nation 
had entered the war because the public had been misled by British and “big business” 
propaganda. Reports of the “Rape of Belgium” and the atrocities perpetrated by 
blood-thirsty Huns sounded eerily similar to Spanish Civil War news about the 
bombing of Guernica and the massacre at Badajoz. Many Americans refused to let 
themselves be duped again and subscribed to Hart’s beliefs that such reports were 
mere Communist propaganda.
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The Irish were the final group that created an effective and popular pro-
Nationalist program. Interestingly, Ireland was the only country which provided 
volunteers and funds for the Nationalists58 and it was also, therefore, the only country 
which sent troops to both Burgos and Madrid.59 On August 10, 1936, the Irish 
Independent ran an open letter from reactionary politician General Eoin O’Duffy on 
the front page. In his letter, O’Duffy suggested the recruitment of an Irish Brigade to 
fight in an “Anti-Red Crusade” and called for volunteers.60 The organizational details 
presented in the article were sketchy but that merely reflected the total lack of 
planning behind the proposal.61 After several months of negotiating with Franco, his 
fellow Irishmen, and the authorities in Dublin, O’Duffy succeeded in transporting 
almost seven hundred men to fight for Franco.62 These troops formed their own 
battalion in the Spanish Foreign Legion under command of Irish and Spanish officers 
and, though their record in battle was unexceptional, their story as the only 
Nationalist volunteers is no less fascinating as a result.
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Ireland, perhaps even more than Spain, was deeply Catholic in 1936 and Irish 
Catholics responded strongly to reports of anti-Catholic atrocities. They also shared 
many of the same anti-communist sensibilities as the American Catholics though, 
unlike the Americans, the Irish were willing to enlist in military support of the 
Nationalist cause. The history of Ireland in the early twentieth-century explains much 
of this enthusiasm.
In 1921, following World War I and the Anglo-Irish war, the Irish Republic 
won Home Rule (not independence) from the British Crown and the right to self-
government for the first time in centuries. Immediately the country collapsed into 
civil war as factions supporting the peace treaty with Britain fought those who 
opposed it. Eventually the anti-treaty faction won but found itself stuck accepting the 
same terms from the British which the treaty had imposed. Many veterans of that 
conflict, as well as men unhappy with unsuccessful careers in the army or police, saw 
the Spanish Civil War as an opportunity to revive their military careers and 
reputations. By some estimates, as many as one third of the Brigade’s recruits came 
from this sort of frustrated military background.63
Another large body of troops enlisted following membership in General 
O’Duffy’s Blueshirt organization. Founded in 1932, the Blueshirts resembled the 
NSDAP and PNI of Germany and Italy in their colored uniforms, mass meetings, 
furious oration, and conservative, ultra-nationalist tone.  Additionally many of the 
organization’s leaders espoused positions sympathetic to fascism and totalitarian 
government. It should be noted however that the general members of the organization 
joined largely out of opposition to Eamon de Valera and the Fianna Fail party and not 
63
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from fascist political beliefs. 64 Those Blueshirts who traveled from Ireland to fight 
with O’Duffy have been described as Fascists, however this term dismisses the 
complexity of their motivation and the principled nature of their choice to volunteer.
The remainder of the recruits were motivated largely by a Catholic, anti-
communist fervor, religious conviction, and a sense of adventure.65 At the time of 
O’Duffy’s letter a fortuitous series of events occurred which dramatically helped 
recruitment. Two movies entitled The Crusades and The Castles of Spain began 
screening, a book describing the exploits of the “Wild Geese” (sixteenth-century Irish 
mercenaries who fought in Spain) gained popularity, and newsreels showing nun’s 
desecrated corpses aroused outrage across the country. These images and stories 
captivated the imaginations of many young men and influenced their decisions to 
enlist.66 Finally, the priesthood acted as unofficial recruiting sergeants, exhorting 
young men to do their Christian duty and protect the faith from atheistic communism. 
Their influence on impetuous young farmers probably accounts for the 
overrepresentation of rural Irish in the Brigade.
The existence of an international volunteer contingent in Franco’s army 
presented the Nationalists with an obvious propaganda opportunity. Displaying 
courageous young Catholics risking death to defend their faith and political beliefs 
might have played well in the international press. The Irish Brigade, however, never 
gained the notoriety enjoyed by the Republican International Brigades and coverage 
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of their actions was quite sparse. This omission may have resulted from the fact that 
O’Duffy’s troops were not involved in any decisive engagements but it more likely 
stems from the Nationalist’s wish not to draw any more attention to their other 
‘volunteers’ from Italy and Germany. Following the war the Irish Brigade returned 
home without fanfare and was rapidly dismissed from public memory.
The forces which rallied to the pro-Nationalist standard during the Spanish 
Civil War did not do so out of any particular appreciation for Franco’s policies. 
Instead they saw themselves largely as anti-Republicans and looked to the 
Nationalists as allies only so far as they served in the struggle against the 
“Communist” Republican forces or to protect the Catholic Church. International 
public opinion supported Franco in his main foreign policy goal- the blockade of the 
Madrid government- but with the disappearance of his enemy, the Caudillo found 
himself totally alone in the world. Only the arrival of a new Communist threat in the 
Cold War saved him, and Spain, from total irrelevance in the decades that followed.
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The Case for Madrid
The success of Manuel Azaña’s Leftist coalition in the 1936 elections 
surprised the many international political observers who had expected a mild victory 
for the right. In a well-reasoned and researched electoral analysis, a correspondent for 
The Economist predicted that Calvo Sotello’s rightist coalition would probably win a 
twenty-five seat majority in the approximately 500 seat Cortes.1 The actual returns, 
however, gave 278 seats to the Left coalition, fifty-odd seats to the center, and 138 to 
the Right despite a margin of only five percent in the popular vote.2 While these 
results outraged Sotello’s supporters, they electrified Leftists around the globe. Spain 
had followed France to become the world’s second nation governed by the Popular 
Front.
When the military rising began, prematurely due to Sotello’s assassination, the 
shaky Popular Coalition faced and failed a severe test. The cabinet proved indecisive 
and President Azaña was forced to appoint three premiers within twenty-four hours 
before José Giral, a chemist and virtual political unknown, formed a stable cabinet 
and distributed weapons to the workers. That distribution reflected the government’s 
inability to maintain order and placed power in the hands of the militant CNT 
(Anarchist) and UGT (Socialist) trade unions. The workers managed to overwhelm 
1
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the rebellion in Madrid, Barcelona, Albacete, and Valencia and their government-
issued weapons granted them effective control over both the streets and local 
authorities. In the areas where the CNT held a majority, primarily Barcelona, this led 
to the sort of proletarian revolution about which Leftist utopians dream. Money was 
abolished, workers seized their factories, the words ‘señor’ and ‘usted’ disappeared, 
and a perfectly egalitarian society seemed at hand.3 However, the “workers’ patrols” 
and property seizures which followed these reforms terrified middle and upper-class 
Spaniards. As it would have been impossible for them to create any sort of moderate 
or right-wing political party given the radical unions which controlled the streets, tens 
of thousands of the petite bourgeoisie instead chose to join the relatively organized 
and predictable Communist Party which loudly called for the retention of the 
Republic. 
The Spanish Communist Party (PSUC) played an almost insignificant role in 
the February elections and boasted only 40,000 members by mid-summer of 1936.4
Immediately following the rising, however, the party’s rolls more than quadrupled in 
size. While these converts were not ideologically committed Communists, their 
membership and money put significant weight behind the voice of the leadership. 
3
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That influence, combined with the fact that the PSUC was the only political 
organization with a positive program, ensured the Communists’ rise to power.5
The CNT and UGT were organized solely as opposition parties.6 The parties, 
which were trade unions, had evolved under the military dictatorship of Primo de 
Rivera during the 1920s and early 30. Deprived of any voice in government they had 
developed into parties of pure protest, unconstrained by the need to implement or 
elaborate their ideas. While they demanded land redistribution, collectivization of 
factories, and the suppression of the Church, the CNT and UGT had formulated no 
actual plans for these policies and believed somewhat naively that ‘revolution’ alone 
would solve all their socio-economic problems. In Catalonia, a region dominated by 
the CNT, the party actually refused to join the government due to the anarchist belief 
that the issuance of orders was in itself demeaning. Likewise in Madrid, the 
revolutionary parties were unable to formulate a program of government and 
abdicated this role to the Communists and moderate Socialists. Most of the radicals 
believed that real power resided in the streets rather than in the government and were 
therefore happy to concede ministerial posts to the PSUC. The largely illiterate and 
uneducated anarchists failed to understand the importance of bureaucracy and threw 
that power away in disgust.  
As the war continued, the organizational strength of the PSUC coupled with 
the backing of the Soviet Union made the Communists indispensable to the 
Republic’s war effort. The Party controlled the new-model “People’s Army”, the 
5
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police, the economy, and foreign policy. In its Popular Front spirit, however, the 
PSUC continued to allow non-Communists to hold titular positions and constantly 
stressed a non-revolutionary vision of the Republic. 
Much as the PSUC and Comintern steered the actual war effort, the 
Communist parties abroad became involved behind the scenes in almost all aspects of 
the pro-Republican movement. According to historian Tom Buchanan, “the 
Communist Party made the Spanish Civil War uniquely its own… the war united the 
Communists and convinced them not only that their strategy was correct, but that 
their cause was just.”7 The influence of Communists, generally in an unofficial 
capacity, was felt in virtually every pro-Republican campaign. The Trojan-horse 
policies of the party during the ‘3rd Period’ had not been forgotten and there was a 
common fear within the non-Communist left that Bolshevik subversion remained a 
continuing risk. At the height of the Popular Front, especially in regards to Spain, this 
fear was groundless.8 It was true, however, that the pro-Republican movement was 
‘riddled with Reds’. In virtually all of the political camps which provided important 
material support for the Republic, the Communist influence was powerful if not 
overriding. 
The International Brigades are unquestionably the most famous and important 
example of pro-Republican support. Between 35,000 and 45,000 men from 53 
countries enlisted in these units, though probably no more than 10,000 were active at 
7
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any one point.9 Some historians, such as Dante Puzzo, argue that the Brigades 
included “some mere adventures and many Communists” but that, “the greatest 
number appear to have been young men of liberal sentiments”.10 In fact, the vast 
majority of members were committed Communists and those who were not joined the 
party nominally as a pre-requisite to enlistment. Robert Rosenstone writes that:
Communist publications of the period liked to give the impression that 
there were hordes of regular Republicans and Democrats in the ranks, but this 
seems little more than wishful thinking. For the vast majority of the troops 
were political radicals, formally enrolled in or sympathizers with America’s 
most left-wing political parties.11
Such a view is not isolated or, indeed, even controversial. When George Orwell 
considered transferring to the International Brigades from his anarchist militia, the 
author sought out a recommendation from Communist acquaintances as a matter of 
course.12 Buchanan describes the British International Brigade as the only twentieth-
century instance in which an English political party fielded an army.13 In the United 
States, Britain, and Ireland, volunteers usually registered to join the Brigades at the 
actual party offices.14 Why then did the Communist party choose to downplay its 
control of an apparently popular organization which it so successfully managed?
The crucial factor lies in the nature of the Popular Front. The Communist 
party, having decided on a course of collective security, needed to create a less 
Bolshevik image and was therefore looking to “localize” its organizations. The 
9
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intention was to make the American party more American, the British party more 
British. Party organizers sought to achieve this goal by appropriating the history and 
symbols of their respective cultures. In one instance, the Young Communists’ League 
of New York celebrated the 162nd anniversary of Paul Revere’s ride, which the 
Daughters of the American Revolutions somehow overlooked, by sending a costumed
horseman down Broadway with a sign reading, “The DAR Forgets but the YCL 
Remembers”.15 Presumably, any organization more in touch with the minutiae of 
American history than the DAR could not possibly threaten that heritage. 
In Britain, the Party sought to link the Brigades not with the Comintern but 
with the “grand tradition” of enlightened British interventionism. Leaflets compared 
the volunteers in Spain with the reputed heroics of Lord Byron in Greece and with the 
Englishmen who fought alongside Garibaldi’s Redshirts.16 Similarly, Irish recruits 
were reminded of Wolfe Tone’s alliance with French Revolutionaries during the 
1790s, the involvement of Irish insurrectionists in the Paris uprising of 1851, and 
O’Donovan Rossa’s support of the Poles in 1863.17 One Communist writer went so 
far as to excuse Spanish church burnings (in which he had participated) by describing 
them as a physical break with the past similar to Protestant “purifications” during the 
Reformation.18 It may stretch credulity too far to equate the actions of atheistic 
Anarchists with those of Oliver Cromwell, but the author’s point cannot be missed. 
Under the Popular Front program, the Communist Party was to redefine itself as an 
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organic part of every nation in which it operated. Were the Party to publicly recruit 
volunteers in violation of government policy and overtly maintain an armed force, its 
political efforts towards a coalition of the left would be damaged. 
 While the organization of the Brigades may have been a rather cynical 
attempt by the Soviet Union to present a concrete example of idealistic anti-fascism, 
the recruits themselves were often motivated as much by personal as by party reasons. 
Indeed, the Party often discouraged its most committed members from traveling to 
Spain as it could ill afford to thin the ranks of its more effective operatives. The Party 
preferred to send non-members whenever possible, though always under strict 
Communist control, and volunteers were most likely to be accepted if they were 
demonstrably committed to leftist ideals (union organizing experience, run-ins with 
strike-breaking police, membership in radical organizations) and had military 
experience or specific skills. 
The basic motivation for these volunteers was almost invariably an intense 
hatred of Fascism.19 In his frequently quoted explanation for volunteering Orwell 
writes:
When the fighting started on 18 July it is probable that every anti-
Fascist in Europe felt a thrill of hope. For here at last, apparently, was 
democracy standing up to Fascism. For years past the so-called democracies 
had been surrendering to Fascism at every step…. It seemed- possibly it was-
the turning of the tide.20
The far-left’s implacable hatred of Hitler and Mussolini was, at the time, rather out of 
step with public opinion which still considered it possible to negotiate with the 
19 The Premature Anti-Fascists: North American Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War 1936-39
(Praeger: NY 1986) by John Gerassi and “The Men of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion,” The Journal of 
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dictators. The brigadistas therefore saw themselves as rather visionary, a view with 
which history has largely agreed.
Describing the volunteers as anti-Fascist really implies very little as such a 
broad category encompasses men from Martin Dies to Josef Stalin.21 The men who 
enlisted did so for more specific reasons. Sailors, students, and miners were the three 
groups most likely to enlist in the Brigades because these were the professions which, 
at the time, were generally the most radicalized.22 The British miners’ unions in 
particular were heavily influence by the Communist party while sailors tended quite 
frequently to be among the foremost anti-Fascists.23 Men who had participated in 
violent labor demonstrations were also over-represented in the Brigades. Several 
American members had been injured by the National Guard during a San Francisco 
waterfront strike while others had been wounded when the Guard and police fired on 
Teamsters in Minneapolis. Rosenstone writes that, for these men, “the news of the 
workers of Spain being armed by the government must have brought a thrill of 
envy.”24
Many of the Irish volunteers were also members of the IRA despite an official 
ban on their enlistment. Almost twenty percent of the Irish contingent was affiliated 
with the IRA and the commander, Frank Ryan, observed that enlistment could have 
been greatly increased without the restriction.25 Perhaps this inherent conflict within 
the “Connolly Column” explains the unit’s inability to achieve unit cohesion or 
21
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operate independently. Indeed, the disruption became so serious that the Irish 
volunteers were eventually rolled into the American Battalion, popularly known as 
the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (ALB), after a disastrous attempt to attach them to the 
British command. 
Minorities enrolled in the Lincoln Brigade though generally not in 
demographic proportion. Jews were over-represented in the Brigades, making up 
approximately 30%, for a variety of reasons.26 New York City is home to a large 
Jewish population and the state of New York accounted for more than four times as 
many recruits as California, the second largest recruiter.27 In the United States the 
YCL was seen as fighting Anti-Semitism, especially in New York. Few of the recruits 
actively practiced their religion though several claimed that Zionism was the 
philosophy which had originally radicalized them. Additionally, many of the 
Brigadiers saw the struggle in Spain as one for an egalitarian society in which race 
and religion would be ignored in favor of class solidarity.
While they made up only a small percentage of the ALB, it is interesting to 
note that over fifty of its members were black. The Communist Party had, during the 
Depression, made a serious effort to mobilize blacks in the United States. With the 
League of Nation’s failure to support Abyssinia against Mussolini, the Communist 
party found a means of reaching out to black activists. In 1937 the Party used the 
slogan, “Ethiopia’s fate is at stake on the battlefields of Spain” to energize 
26 Crusade, 110. 
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“internationally-minded” blacks in Harlem. 28 In The Daily Worker one writer 
editorialized that:
The Negro people, earnestly desiring the defeat of Italian Fascism in 
Ethiopia, can best help their magnificently heroic brothers in the African 
country by throwing all their support to the Spanish people… A defeat for 
Mussolini in Spain will rebound immediately to the great advantage of the 
Ethiopian people. 29
The campaign appears to have worked as several nurses and doctors volunteered for 
the ALB along with the fighting men and, according to one historian, “support for 
Spain had assumed an almost fashionable air, becoming a symbol of sophistication 
and political awareness among Harlem’s intelligentsia.”30
While the activity of the Communist Party in Harlem was certainly positive 
from the perspective of race relations, some writers have argued that the Republican 
effort as a whole often less enlightened. 31 The prominent Spanish Civil War historian 
Tom Buchanan suggests that in Britain and the United States, outside of the 
Northeast, some Republican supporters chose to emphasize the role of Franco’s 
Moorish troops in the Civil War. Raising the specter of black soldiers marauding 
through white Spain would certainly have undermined support for the Nationalists in 
many constituencies. Such reports would also have reminded the public that the 
soldiers carrying out Franco’s “Catholic Crusade” were actually African Muslims. 
While the New York edition of The Daily Worker strongly supported blacks in 
Harlem and expressed outrage over lynching and Jim Crow laws, it is entirely 
28
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possible that other supporters of the Republic chose the low road in seeking support 
for Madrid.
The American Socialist Party was the only non-Communist organization 
which attempted to field an independent body of troops in Spain. Displaying 
considerably less subtlety than their Communist rivals, the Socialists launched a 
campaign to equip a 500 man “Eugene V. Debs Column” by notifying the New York 
Times and placing advertisements in leftist papers such as The Nation and The New 
Republic.32 It was claimed that the unit was already “over-subscribed by many 
hundreds,” and that a drive for $50,000 to underwrite transportation was well 
underway. Other American leftists quickly condemned the proposed column saying 
that it would “open a breach [in the veneer of neutrality] through which American 
reactionaries can pour a flood of money, munitions, and recruits to General Franco’s 
aid.”33 When the FBI and US attorney’s office announced that they were to begin an 
investigation of the column and the Socialist party in general, the proposal was 
allowed to fade from public notice.34
The foreign press first reported on the International Brigades in connection 
with the defense of Madrid. The reports generally described a jaunty column of 
idealists marching through the boarded up streets of Madrid, singing the 
International, and arriving at the outer gates of the city just in time to single-handedly 
slam them shut on the advancing Nationalists. While over a third of the Internationals 
involved in that first confrontation were killed, Spanish soldiers, officials, and 
32
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journalists whose countrymen had shouldered much of the fighting naturally found 
such an interpretation frustrating. In the interest of promoting further support 
however, such objections were generally muted and the foreign press was encouraged 
to report on the Brigades.35
The International Brigades, by keeping the public’s attention focused on the 
trenches around Madrid, proved highly effective propaganda instruments. Citizens of 
the United States and Britain who had not committed to either side read about their 
countrymen fighting and dying in Spain and must have been influenced by the 
romanticism of the struggle. By appearing to stand up for the underdog the 
International Brigades appealed, in a way, to the Anglo-Saxon sense of sportsmanship 
and helped to make the pro-Republican case much more effective.
In New York, The Daily Worker tended to focus on the fact that it was 
Americans who were fighting in Spain, not Communists, leftists, or comrades. 
Headlines such as “24 Yanks Captured by Spanish Fascists,” “Yanks in the Thick of 
It in Spain,” and “Yankee Squadron Bombs Fascist Lines” served to indicate that the 
members of the Lincoln Brigade were real, patriotic Americans.36 Similar coverage of 
British brigadistas was reported in the London edition of The Daily Worker. When 
discussing the general conduct of the war, the Communist press made efforts to 
minimize its domination of the Republican military and promote the concept of a 
united front. Headlines described Spanish Communists “leading” and “spearheading” 
35
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Republican efforts but always trumpeted the militias and Socialists fighting alongside 
them. Daily Worker articles mentioned the “effectiveness of labor unity [in the] 
miracle of Spain’s fight on Fascism,”37 and advised that “unity of action is the 
burning need of the hour. Socialist and Communist effort for Spain can move 
mountains.”38
Many groups which could or would not offer military support to the Republic 
still provided material aid to the cause. First among these was the British labor 
movement. Following its disastrous 1926 general strike, the leadership of the Labour 
party was disinclined to confront government policy in any radical way.39
Additionally, the Labour party feared losing the support of Catholic workers who 
sympathized with Franco and therefore chose not to discuss the war publicly. The 
refusal of the leadership to advocate “extra-parliamentary action”, i.e. strikes and 
protests, led to frustration in the lower tiers of the hierarchy and among some of the 
workers themselves. These feelings were particularly pronounced in the miners’ 
union (MFGB), in which there was then a strong Communist presence, and the
Aircraft Shop Stewards National Council (ASSNC) which was likewise subject to a, 
“strong Communist influence.”40 These two unions agitated within their umbrella 
organization, the Trades Union Congress (TUC), for action to be taken in regards to 
the situation in Spain while working independently to raise funds for the cause.
37
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The MFGB put forward numerous propositions at every TUC meeting calling 
for an end to the embargo, League of Nations action to end the war, measures to 
“suppress piracy in the Mediterranean,” and the withdrawal of Italian and German 
troops.41 The miners also declared their solidarity with the people of the Republic, 
particularly their fellow miners in the Asturias region, and called the TUC’s attention 
to the “class war on the soil of Spain.”42
The union took more practical measures to support the Republic by sending a 
commission to report on the needs of refugees and Spanish miners. Upon that 
commission’s return, and a consultation with the Miners’ International, the union 
donated £70,000 to the Spanish Workers’ Fund43 and agreed on a levy of 2s. 6d. per 
member to aid the Spanish people44. It should be noted that such a levy was more 
than ten times that which was generally organized in support of fellow British 
workers during a strike. The MFGB also undertook a rather creative “Milk for Spain 
Fund” which sold tokens through the union’s Co-Operative shops, raising significant 
funds for food assistance.45 As Nationalist forces over-ran the Basque region, home to 
many Spanish miners, the MFGB volunteered to support some of the nearly 4,000 
children shipped to Britain46 as well as providing bond for refugee miners who were 
awaiting visas and asylum hearings in Britain.47
The engineering shop stewards were also involved in agitation within the 
TUC and made demands similar to those of the miners. The mechanics organized the 
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Voluntary Industrial Assistance movement which refurbished vehicles, equipment, 
and machines which were then sent on to the Republic free of charge.48 In addition to 
refitting vehicles, the aircraft workers also purchased nine ‘lorries’, packed them with 
food and medical supplies, and shipped them to Barcelona despite the protestations of 
the union executive. Most visibly, the ASSNC organized an unofficial demonstration 
in front of Parliament in the closing weeks of the war. 49 The demonstration, though 
involving only 1,200 aeronautical workers, garnered widespread attention because the 
production of aircraft was vital to the nation’s re-armament program. Had the workers 
maintained their efforts, the government would have faced tremendous political 
pressures due to the necessity of catching up to Hitler’s Luftwaffe. As it happened, 
the Spanish Civil War ended shortly after the first demonstration, mooting the 
disagreement.
Aside from the aircraft workers’ strike, which was not sanctioned by the local 
union representatives, supporters of the Republic in the British labor movement faced 
serious difficult in making their views known to the general public. The leadership, 
which controlled the unions’ relationship with the press and government, refused to 
follow the line demanded by many workers whose voices were therefore muted. 
Though the MFGB and ASSNC were motivated internally, they could not make their 
views known more widely and were therefore relatively unimportant in the formation 
of public opinion.
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In the United States, organized labor remained relatively quiet on the question 
of the Spanish Civil War. As in Britain, concern about the loss of Catholic members 
quieted the leadership. Instead of war coverage, discussions of the New Deal and 
Social Security tended to cover the pages of labor publications.50 Members of 
America’s non-Communist left, (Progressives, for want of a better term), however, 
were quite vocal in their support of the Republican government for a number of 
reasons, particularly because of class considerations, a sense of fairness, and fervent 
anti-Fascism. 
In the 1920s and 30s the only recognized parties to the left of the Democrats 
were the Communists and the Socialists. The Communist Party’s political line has 
already been examined in regards to the International Brigades and, as their ineptitude 
in establishing the “Debs Column” indicates, the Socialist Party was far from 
effective at the time. Indeed, in the 1930s the Socialists were, according to most 
historians, a political non-entity.51 Progressive radicalism was not extinguished 
however, it merely lacked a party. In the United States several voices spoke to this 
political wilderness, chief among which were The New Republic and The Nation. 
Claiming to view the news, “through the cold, hard eye of the militant Progressive,”52
The Nation can be taken, without too much license, as a representative publication. 
The Nation maintained several correspondents in Republican Spain, including past 
50
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Socialist and future Princeton historian Louis Fischer, and accepted contributions 
from leftist authors as diverse as Leon Trotsky, Thomas Mann, and Norman Thomas. 
In its first editorial about the Spanish Civil War, The Nation offers some 
insight into non-Communists’ major reasons for its support of the government, “this 
revolutionary outburst [the military rising] comes not from communists or other left-
wing radicals, or from the land-hungry peasants, or the organized workers, but from 
the military men sworn to uphold the existing government.”53 American Progressives 
were angered by the nearly feudal social system in Spain with its massive class 
distinctions between the “land-hungry peasants”, “organized workers”, and the 
privileged military caste which has turned on them. The author also betrays his anger 
at the inequality of the struggle between the betrayed workers and the trained soldiers. 
Various writers return to the same point by describing the tremendous technological 
advantages enjoyed by Nationalist pilots and troops who have access to German and 
Italian weapons54 and the de facto invasion of Spain by Italian and German troops.55
As with Orwell, an outraged sense of fair-play made many non-Communist liberals 
sympathize with the Republic.
The question of class returns when an editorialist argues that, “If there is one 
thing more striking than any other about this extraordinary war, it is the lack of 
individual heroes. The hero is the mass, the mass that mobilizes itself, arms itself, 
feeds itself, and hurls itself against the insurgents in a great, irresistible wave.”56
American Progressives clearly found themselves among those who, “must support the 
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gallant resistance of the workers” in a conflict which, “matters profoundly, not only 
for Spain but for mankind.”57 While not crying out for revolution, in fact The Nation
in particular spoke out against revolution in the midst of war, the Progressives’ 
solidarity with the laboring classes clearly led to sympathy with the Republic. 
Combined with an intense anti-Fascism, which this essay will avoid 
belaboring, the sense of fair-play and class-consciousness made American 
Progressives highly visible supporters of the government in Madrid. They worked to 
shift public opinion by constantly reminding the reader that it was the Nationalists 
who began the war and who therefore deserve the public’s opprobrium.58 In addition 
to assigning war-guilt, the non-Communist press resorted to the same sorts of atrocity 
stories so frequently found in the Catholic Press with headlines such as “Fascist 
Terror in Majorca”, “Under Fire in Madrid”, and “General Franco’s Deathlist”.59
Such articles were accompanied by the inevitable apologies for Republican 
atrocities. Following the August church burnings in Catalonia a correspondent 
remarks that, “No one denies that excesses occurred in the first flush of victory, but 
they were speedily terminated” and that anyway, “civil war naturally carries a certain 
danger with it.”60  Two weeks later the same correspondent notes that, “All churches 
except the cathedral had been destroyed, and their ruins in some instances were still 
smoldering.”61 While such a self-contradicting report displays journalistic integrity, 
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the next lines go on to discount the importance of the damage and to insist such 
incidents were highly localized.
More interestingly perhaps, writers for The Nation consistently worked to link 
events in Spain to the United States and to American history. An editorial discussing 
whether to award belligerent rights to the Nationalist forces reminds the reader about 
the Alabama incident of the American Civil War in which the South attempted to 
claim the right to purchase, arm, and refit blockade runners in British ports.62 To 
familiarize the readers with the situation faced by Barcelona and Valencia following 
the establishment of Italian forces on Majorca, an author compares it to the Royal 
navy seizing Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard during the American Civil War and, 
“supposing aviation to have been then developed”, using the two islands to bomb 
New York and Boston.63 The analogy serves relatively well and drives home the 
outrage felt by Republicans and their American sympathizers following German and 
Italian interventions. More importantly it translates and makes concrete for the 
American mind, which understandably knows little of Spanish geography, the 
importance of seemingly minor shifts in the fortunes of war in Iberia. 
The Nation did rather less well in analyzing the effects of those changes. 
Throughout the conflict journalists in Spain and their editors in New York proved 
incapable of admitting to their readers that the war was being lost. When considering 
the probable loss of Madrid in 1936, which surely would have been a tremendous 
blow to the Republican cause, Louis Fischer notes that, “damaging though it would 
be, [the loss] might indeed release that burst of energy and determination which the 
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Spanish revolution has thus far lacked.”64 The most breathtaking denial of reality by 
The Nation’s correspondents can surely be found in a dispatch describing the fall of 
the Basque region which opines that, “the fall of Bilbao has been skillfully use by the 
Negrin government to stimulate enthusiasm at the front and the rear. This is less 
strange than would at first appear…[given] an unbroken chain of Loyalist defeats.”65
Beyond such wild optimism and the understandable biases already discussed, 
only one serious complaint can be lodged against the Progressive coverage of the war. 
Aside from Norman Thomas, sometime correspondent for The Nation and head of the 
essentially defunct Socialist Party, the major organs and personalities of the American 
leftist press refused to cover the Stalinist purges then occurring in Spain.66 The New 
Republic and The Nation remained perfectly silent on the topic as an editorial 
decision. Their boards, as well as most other leftists, felt that discussion of such 
tragedies would only weaken support for the overriding objective of defeating Franco 
and the Nationalists. The same logic prevented many from speaking up on the issue. 
Sam Baron, treasurer of the Socialist party and some-time correspondent in Spain, 
provided a lonely exception by, over the condemnation of his colleagues, testifying to 
the hated Dies Commission about the Stalinist repression.
American Progressives offered more than mere moral support; they were also 
active in providing material assistance to the Republic. In 1937 The Nation published 
an appeal for donations to furnish a “food ship” for Spain. Following the initial 
announcement in February of 1937, readers supplied over one quarter million pounds 
64
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of flour, 75,000 tins of sardines, 88,000 cans of evaporated milk, many tons of corned 
beef and beans, and $27,000 to pay for transport.67 At a cost of three cents on the 
dollar these supplies were sent to Spain where they joined contributions from 
humanitarians around the globe including the flour shipments discussed in the 
previous chapter.
In addition to food, which was sent frequently from Britain in similar “food 
ships”, humanitarians in America, England, and Scotland sent significant medical 
support to the Republic. The Communist party established several hospitals behind 
the front lines including two intended solely for the International Brigades. 
Americans contributed large sums of money, nearly one million dollars, to the 
Medical Bureau/North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy.68 Spanish 
Medical Aid, a British organization, also sent doctors, nurses, and ambulances to the 
Republic. While this organization was heavily influenced by Communist members, it 
retained enough independent initiative to be considered more than a front 
organization for the party.69
While most support for the Republic originated on the left side of the political 
spectrum, one important lobby was rooted firmly on the right. During the Great 
Depression many Britons came to appreciate the importance, and vulnerability, of the 
British Empire more than ever before. With foreign trade down, high unemployment, 
and political instability in Europe, the existence of the Empire as a captive market, 
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socio-economic release valve, and totem of national pride became increasingly 
important to many British Conservatives.
It would be expected that British business interests and the Foreign Service 
would look quite favorably on Franco and his avowedly capitalist supporters at the 
outbreak of the conflict, especially given reports of Anarchist and Communist 
revolutions occurring along Spain’s Mediterranean coast. Italian intervention, 
however, changed the diplomatic calculus significantly. A pro-Empire faction of 
British conservatives began to consider the strategic implications of a Nationalist 
victory and tentatively threw their weight behind the Republican government.
The maintenance of communications with Egypt, Suez, South Africa, and 
India was the factor of prime concern to the pro-Empire faction. In Parliament the 
Duchess of Atholl rose to note that, “if General Franco should gain the victory in 
Spain he would owe it very largely to the assistance he had from Germany and Italy, 
and… may find himself obliged to transfer to either of those countries some of the 
outlying possession of Spain, such as the Balearic Islands, or the Canaries.”70 Such a 
situation would place in serious jeopardy not only Britain’s sea lanes around Africa 
and through the Mediterranean, but also its relationship with France. The French plan 
for war with Germany, a possibility which grew more likely with every month, 
included the shipment of colonial troops from North Africa, across the Mediterranean 
to Europe. Were Italy or Germany to possess bases straddling this route, such a 
transfer would be impossible and France would be seriously deterred from war with 
either nation and might very well leave Britain alone against the Continent. 
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Beyond concern about the colonies themselves, the same faction was 
concerned about the war’s effects on old-fashioned balance of power calculations. As 
an article in The Economist during the early weeks of the conflict warned its readers, 
“this country… may have to reckon with a Spain which forms a third military 
dictatorship on the third frontier of France and the second military dictatorship in the 
Mediterranean.”71 Continuing the argument some months later a writer noted that, 
“France’s strategic position in Europe will become damaged, perhaps beyond all 
repair, if Germany or Italy, or a combination of both, becomes established in 
Spain.”72 Simultaneously the pro-Imperialists saw, “yet another opportunity for 
British, French, American, and other democratic statesmen to resume the 
international leadership that is fast slipping from their hands.”73 Not without reason, 
therefore, a significant body of the British establishment found itself promoting the 
interests of “red” Spain to the British public and government.
The pro-Imperialists generally deployed rather subtle arguments. They stood 
back from the nasty details of the conflict and sought to observe the Civil War from a 
relatively distant perspective. Downplaying atrocity accusations from both sides with 
an almost stereotypical British coolness one correspondent reports that: 
It is accepted as a commonplace that [Nationalist airmen] bombarded 
at sight Red Cross hospitals and trains, so the Red Cross sign is no longer 
displayed on the Government lines.
On the other hand quite irresponsible and poisonous stories are being 
sent out about “red” atrocities… [a less objective correspondent] reported that 
100 persons had been thrown from windows at Malaga… In a panic, the 
Government supporters threw several persons- certainly not more than ten-
71
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out of windows… there are plenty of business and professional men at Malaga 
carrying on as usual.74
Following the bombing of Guernica this aloof attitude was momentarily dropped but 
the pro-Imperial faction refused to become emotionally involved in the Spanish Civil 
War. Instead they repeatedly questioned the security of Gibraltar and cited reports of 
German or Italian gun emplacement being constructed in Morocco.75 While such 
arguments may have lacked the emotional power of articles written in The Nation, 
The Daily Worker, or The Pilot, their measured and rational approach was quite 
effective in moving important segments of British public opinion towards the 
Republic.
Possibly the most important group of Republican supporters, at least in regard 
to historical opinion, were the intellectuals. While such a category is hopelessly 
broad, including thinkers from Orwell and Picasso to Albert Einstein, it must be 
defined that way in order to capture the diverse artistic and intellectual community 
which supported the Madrid government. In one historian’s opinion, “only two 
figures of any significance wrote on the side of the Nationalists, Wyndham Lewis and 
Roy Campbell.”76 Some, such as T.S. Elliot and Ezra Pound, declared themselves 
neutral, while a few Catholics such as Evelyn Waugh and C.S. Lewis remained silent. 
C.S. Forester traveled to Spain with the intention of writing in support of the 
Nationalists but returned from his trip appalled by the upper-class Spaniards who he 
had encountered who, he claimed, hoped to restore the Inquisition.77 While noting 
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such exceptions, it can be fairly argued the entire intelligentsia of the West strongly 
favored the Republic.
Given support from such a wide range of independent individuals it is 
important to determine at least a handful of the ideas which drew them together. Anti-
Fascism and the growing acceptance of a united front78 against the dictators clearly 
provided the major motivation for pro-Republican intellectuals. Even Ernest 
Hemingway, long derided as the most politically unconscious of thinkers, re-wrote 
the climax of his novel To Have and to Have Not after his experiences in Spain. 
Following Hemingway’s revision, the dying protagonists chokingly mutters, “No 
matter how, a man alone ain’t got no bloody fucking chance.”79
While virtually all intellectuals at the time, and certainly all today, believed 
that the political systems in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were anathema to 
freedom and the artistic process, it was not entirely clear in 1936 that this would be 
the case in Spain. However, the wanton murder of the Spanish poet Federico García 
Lorca by Nationalist sympathizers combined with the destruction of Guernica and the 
suppression of dissent rapidly convinced those few undecided that the Nationalists 
were the enemy of free thinking and culture in general.
Supporters of the Republic received very little positive news from the fronts. 
After successfully quelling the revolt in Madrid, Barcelona, and other industrial 
centers, the government’s war effort slowly sank into a strategic quicksand from 
which no cabinet could escape. Despite, (perhaps because of), the fact that the 
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Republic seemed destined to lose, its supporters were active and vocal throughout the 
conflict. While foreign public opinion barely registered support for either side in 
1936, by the time Madrid finally fell a clear majority in the Western democracies 
favored the Republic. While ineffective at the time, the durability and importance of 
this opinion has had great significance since.
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History’s Verdict
Given that nearly fifty years have elapsed since the American Institute of 
Public Opinion last asked the question, it would seem foolish to hope that modern 
pollsters would frequently receive a positive reply to the question, “Will you please 
tell me who General Franco [was]?”.1 Even in 1945, only six years removed from the 
end of the Spanish Civil War, only fifty-three percent of the public could identify the 
Caudillo and a full quarter of those held no opinion regarding his policies or 
personality. Today the average American, at least in the author’s experience, believes 
the Spanish Civil War to be vaguely connected with Cuba and yellow journalism.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that most students first encounter the Spanish 
Civil War through their study of art, language, or literature. Indeed, few high-school 
students fail to find Picasso’s Guernica in at least one of their textbooks. While 
teachers may described the impact of strategic bombing on public opinion or the 
artistic merits of the painting, a nuanced discussion of the war and its political 
ramifications is unlikely to follow such a lesson. Therefore, most lasting impressions 
of the conflict probably result from reading the most famous novel of the war, 
Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls.2 While an excellent book3, Hemingway’s 
treatment of the war itself is best summed up in the common criticism to the effect 
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that it is, “Less a book about the Spanish War than a book about Spain.” Indeed, most 
literary critics note the lengths to which the author goes to dissociate his hero from 
the actual political meaning of the war. Aside from these two works and an offhand 
mention in Casablanca, few contemporary Americans are aware of the conflict which 
electrified activists around the globe.4 While the Spanish Civil War may not be the 
stuff of mini-series, its influence on English-speaking thought and culture none-the-
less remains important. 
After the concerted efforts made by both sides to swing foreign public opinion 
it must surely be important to ask, “Who won the war abroad?” Less than a quarter of 
Americans supported the Loyalists in early 1937 but that number rose to over seventy 
percent in late 1938 before declining again as interest waned. 5 Though public opinion 
polls were not conducted in Britain until late 1938, a solid fifty-seven percent 
supported the Loyalists at that time and the number continued on a positive trend 
throughout the conflict.6 Clearly then, the supporters of the Republic were more 
successful than their rivals in winning public opinion. 
The previous chapters have sought to explain the commitment certain political 
constituencies either for or against the Republic. For those with only a passing 
interest in the conflict, the majority in the United States and a significant minority in 
Great Britain, traditional Anglo-Saxon sympathy for the underdog combined with the 
tragic heroism of an impossible defense to create a feeling of support for Madrid. 
4
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Additionally, the threat posed by Italy and Germany increased significantly during the 
war with Berlin’s acquisitions of Czechoslovakia and Austria. These factors 
combined with the propaganda efforts of the Comintern, Progressives, pro-
Imperialists, and Intellectuals to eventually cause a majority of British and American 
citizens to prefer the Loyalists.
The majority’s passive support and expressions of concern, however, proved 
of little value to the Republic whose war effort, coincidentally, entered a terminal 
phase just as the foreign public began to back it. The International Brigades were of 
immense tactical importance in actual combat but their contribution appears 
infinitesimal compared to the strategic benefits the Loyalists might have enjoyed 
without Non-Intervention. Had the factories of America, France, and Britain supplied 
Madrid with tanks, guns, and airplanes to match those provided by the Fascists, the 
war might well have ended differently. The ability of Burgos’ supporters to retain 
Non-Intervention, their sole objective, indicates a victory for their efforts during the 
war. Because Republican sympathizers were unable to convince enough of their 
fellow citizens to actively support the cause, Franco could conduct a war of attrition 
in which the isolated Loyalists could not compete. While the conflict lasted, the 
Republic lost the contest for public opinion in the only critical battle.
The propaganda war, however, did not truly end in 1939. Loyalists such as 
“La Pasionaria”, (Dolores Ibàrruri), and President Azaña fled to London and the 
former colonies, especially Mexico which provided asylum for many Leftists during 
the 1930s. From exile they wrote countless memoirs, histories, and letters but these 
62
lacked scholarly rigor and too often became bogged down in assigning blame for 
defeat. To counteract these dissident voices, Franco’s government established a 
ministry of history which, through its monopoly on all archives in Spain, dominated 
all interpretation of the Civil War.7 Largely as a result of these efforts, independent 
Spanish-language study of the war virtually ceased from the 1940s until the late 
1970s when the regime fell.8 Filling this gap, Anglo-American historians such as 
Bernard Bolloten, Paul Preston, Allen Guttman, and Herbert Rutledge Southworth 
wrote about the war from abroad and from the few Spanish archives to which they 
were granted minimal access. With scholars subject to unequal archival access, 
conflicting interpretations of events often became enmeshed with personal differences 
to the detriment of discourse.9 While Franco’s Movimiento may have distorted 
scholarly study for most of the century the eventual victor of the struggle for history’s 
decision is not in doubt.
Robert Stradling illustrates the Loyalists’ victory in the picturesque opening to 
his 1999 study of the Irish volunteers. He describes two plots in the same rural 
cemetery; “One of these graves is often decorated with flowers and other favors of 
public esteem. The other is overgrown with bushes, almost impossible even for the 
determined visitor to find.”10 The first tomb belongs to Frank Ryan, commander of 
the Irish contingent of the International Brigade, the second to his rival, Eoin 
O’Duffy, who raised the Irish Column to fight alongside Franco. In Ireland, as 
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elsewhere, support for the Loyalist cause is unchallenged. Even in Spain few profess 
sympathy for the Nationalists and those groups which favored him in the 1930s are 
loath to do so today. While foreign public opinion never appeared to back Franco, 
powerful historical trends must be at work to so completely shift the judgment of 
those who had previously supported the Nationalists.
American Catholics were among the loudest groups supporting Franco in his 
struggle against the Popular Front government in Madrid. As seen previously, the 
hierarchy exhorted its members to lobby their representatives in favor of non-
Intervention. Even humanitarian aid which might have benefited Republican forces 
was squashed by Catholic pressure on Congress and the Administration. The level of 
Catholic support, however, was never quite as deep as it may have appeared. 
Though millions may have listened to Fr. Coughlin and sent letters to their 
Congressman, history records no American Catholic volunteers and concrete aid to 
the Nationalists was minimal. The Tablet, mouthpiece of the Brooklyn archdiocese, 
ran a collection in 1938 described as, “the only distinctively Catholic organization 
receiving contributions for the sufferers in Spain.”11 Collecting over $5,000 in the 
summer of 1937, the newspaper forwarded all but $113 of that to Spain. The Pilot 
proudly compared this ratio to that of the pro-Republican organizations but neglected 
to extend the comparison to size rather than efficiency. 
During the period from May of 1937 until the end of 1938 The Tablet’s fund 
collected over $30,000 but this is pittance compared with the nearly $2 million dollars 
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amassed by pro-Loyalist organizations.12 While almost twenty-five percent of that 
money was spent on “advertising and administration” in the United States and 
therefore never reached Spain, the fact that such sums were raised indicates that 
enthusiasm for the Republic was quite significant. Though it organized some 
impressive letter-writing campaigns, in fundraising, the Catholic lobby simply did not 
have mass appeal on the same level as their opponents.
The failure to provide funds for the Nationalists clearly did not affect the 
success of their war effort and it should not be forgotten that the real aid for Franco 
came from Italy and Germany. In continuing the advantage created by Non-
Intervention, pro-Nationalist Catholics succeeded in the short term. The shortcoming, 
in regard to the Nationalist legacy, lies in their inability to sustain any popular support 
for the Caudillo following the end of the war. That support had rested largely on 
American Catholic’s association with their Church rather than with society in 
general.13 The existence of a strong Catholic Press, Catholic trade unions, Catholic 
schools and universities, and Catholic youth organizations all indicate this divide. 
While the obedient mass which Protestant America envisioned did not exist in the 
1930s, there was still a strong feeling of ‘otherness’ amongst Catholics which unified 
them and allowed them to identify closely with their co-religionists in Spain.14
When the Cold War reached its peaks in the 1950s and 60s, American 
Catholic support for Franco and the nationalists waned as Catholicism became an 
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accepted part of mainstream American culture.15 During those decades the fear of 
Communism and a competition with the Soviet Union became two of the key features 
of the American thinking. Because being Catholic was almost synonymous with 
being anti-Communist, Catholics were considered solid and dependable Americans. 
Following the election of JFK, First Communion became as American as Little 
League and the importance of distinctly Catholic institutions, such as The Pilot, 
decreased. With American Catholics no longer on the fringe of society, their feeling 
of kinship with Spanish Catholics faded, and with it, their memories of pro-Franco 
agitation. 
Catholic support also diminished in the decades following the war as the 
nature of the Franco regime became more obvious. Most American members of the 
Church were staunch democrats who thought that Franco was fighting merely for the 
rights of religious freedom which they themselves enjoyed, a sort of “American way 
of life” for Spain. The hierarchy fostered this belief through the Spain/America 
comparisons described previously and by ‘clarifying’ Nationalist speeches and press 
releases. According to some historians, as it became clear that “General Franco was 
not fighting for this kind of Catholicism compatible with liberal democratic ideals,” 
American Catholics abandoned his camp.16
Catholics outside the United States, even in Spain, began to reconsider their 
support for General Franco during the 1960s. In the decades following World War II 
Pope Pius’ silence in the face of Fascist atrocities became a source of embarrassment 
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for the Church. In 1965 the church removed much of that embarrassment, and the 
central rationale for support of Franco’s Movimiento, by formally disavowing the 
union between Church and State as part of the second Vatican Council. Following the 
council, the Spanish hierarchy began calling for greater civil liberties and began to 
reject the government’s interference in its internal affairs. The Church’s decision to 
refocus on service and relief for the oppressed cemented Catholics’ rejection of the 
Nationalist cause.17 With their motivations for support removed, it is understandable 
that Catholics ceased to argue in favor of Franco’s regime.
Isolationists, pacifists, and anti-Communists in Britain and the United States 
were also de facto supporters of the Franco regime. By refusing aid to the Republic 
and allowing Italian and German intervention, they effectively doomed the Popular 
Front government. As support for Franco had been purely incidental, (provided the 
owner kept his finger in the dike they did not care what armband he wore), they, like 
the Catholics, reevaluated their support for Franco and began to step back from their 
previous positions following the Second World War.
The bombing of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent experience of total war 
convinced most Americans that isolationism was untenable in the age of the airplane 
and atom bomb. In a break with tradition, the United States maintained its armed 
forces at a high level of readiness rather than cutting back to a skeleton force. 
America built bases and maintained troops around the globe, refusing to accept that 
17
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the Atlantic and Pacific alone could protect the homeland. Simultaneously, the theory 
of containment replaced the pacifism and isolationism which had previously guided 
American foreign policy. 
America and Britain’s first serious thoughts about “intervention” occurred 
during the Spanish Civil War. Supporters of the Republican government saw Italy, 
Germany, Abyssinia, Spain, and Czechoslovakia fall under control of Fascism 
without the democracies firing a shot and made a powerful case to the public. Though 
the pro-Republicans were ineffective at the time, the ‘domino effect’ and resulting 
Truman Doctrine clearly stem at least in part from America’s experience with that 
conflict.18 When many who had previously been strong isolationists became 
advocates of ‘containment’ they ceased making a case for the Nationalists.19
The Irish who fought with Eoin O’Duffy returned home quietly and they and 
their supporters were quickly forgotten. Though his men had volunteered intending to 
fight for the Church and anti-Communism, the unit was still tainted by association 
with dictatorship and Hitler’s horrors. These memories did not sit well with the 
twentieth century Irish emphasis on liberty and anti-imperialism. In the 1960s, as the 
Free State began to campaign on behalf of oppressed peoples around the world, 
establishing a deservedly high reputation for humanitarianism, the Irish Brigade was 
18
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quietly forgotten.20 When the Church itself turned away from Franco’s junta, the last 
vestiges of pro-Nationalism vanished in Ireland. 
While the issues which had motivated pro-Nationalist opinion lost influence in 
the latter decades of the century, most bases of pro-Republican opinion continued to 
strengthen. This may merely reflect the fact that, having been defeated, the 
Republican administration existed only in rosy hindsight, a vague and Romantic 
imagination. Attributing the positive image of the Republic to faulty collective 
memory, however, does little to advance the historical understanding of the war’s 
effects and the success of the combatants’ propaganda. 
The Radicals who enlisted in the International Brigades and those men and 
women who supported their units did not disappear in 1939 but joined in the general 
anti-Fascism surrounding World War II. The silence of the far left on domestic 
matters during the war, which had not been a hallmark of their campaign in 1936, 
resulted both from the Anglo-American alliance with the Soviet Union and from the 
need to unite against the Nazi menace, even at the expense of deferring the class 
struggle. Following the war, the CPUSA and CPGB emerged from their self-imposed 
silence but quickly faced persecution by Red-hunters such as Joseph McCarthy. The 
Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade was declared a Communist front-
organization and duly investigated and harassed. Those who had volunteered in Spain 
were often considered subversive and those who had donated to Republican causes, 
(even Shirley Temple), were regarded with suspicion. 
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While the witch hunts of the 1950s forced leftists of all stripes underground, 
the ideas themselves remained potent. During the mid-to-late 1960s, as Radicalism 
once more began to flourish, the concept of “political awareness” which had been so 
important to the Brigadiers became popular once more.21 Poems, novels, and plays 
emerged which referred to the Spanish Civil War as a touchstone of the popular 
conscience.22 The existentialist Albert Camus observed, “It was in Spain that men 
learned that one can be right and yet be beaten, that force can vanquish spirit, that 
there are times when courage is not its own recompense.”23 That knowledge was 
shocking to the idealists of the 1930s and tempered the future expectations of those 
who had experienced the war. The same frustrations felt by returning brigadistas may 
be seen in post-1968 idealists of the next generation.24
Less radical supporters of the Loyalists government from the non-Communist 
left actually came to speak more openly for the Republic following its demise largely 
due to the Madrid government’s non-existence. The weight of Stalinist repression 
which had privately bothered the pro-Republicans was removed by Franco’s victory. 
The exiled Spanish leaders, no longer reliant on Soviet goodwill, were able to 
downplay the importance of Russian arms and advisors and successfully improve the 
Republic’s international image. Free to shed the ally who had become a public 
21
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relations liability, Republic no longer needed to apologize for Stalin’s show trials and 
the suppression of the anarchists in Barcelona.
Progressive voices gained power as the anti-Fascism which had motivated 
their opposition to Franco became a universal value following the start of the Second 
World War. As early (non-Communist) opponents of anti-Fascism, the Progressives 
and their cause gained currency in popular culture, especially in Europe. Enjoying a 
“first mover” advantage of sorts, the Progressives were able to resurrect much of their 
political program. The same concerns for class and fairness which motivated 
Progressive writing on the Spanish Civil War might well be traced to the Great 
Society reforms of the 1960s.
The pro-Imperialists who had prophesied grave dangers in a Nationalist 
victory were partially vindicated by the Second World War. After 1940 some French 
politicians and soldiers claimed that a friendly Spain might have provided enough 
defensive depth to save France from blitzkrieg. These arguments smack of 
scapegoating and can be dismissed but the fears of German influence in Morocco and 
the threat to British shipping were both partially correct. The Germans did exercise 
considerable influence in Morocco through the Vichy French and managed to control 
much of North Africa through late 1943. Additionally, had the Allies gained the use 
of air bases in the Canaries the shipping lanes through the North Atlantic might have 
been considerably safer during the critical months of 1942.25 It must be concluded, 
however, that the Nationalist’s victory in Spain did not shut the Mediterranean and 
did not result in German dominance of the Empire’s supply lines. Additionally, at the 
25
 The same has often been alleged of Ireland and DeValera’s refusal of the Treaty Ports.
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end of the Second World War British Imperialists were more concerned with the 
imminent independence of India (1947), war in Palestine (1948), and disorder in 
Egypt (1951) than with protecting the good name of Francisco Franco. These facts 
diminished the historical voice of the pro-Imperialists who, anyway, had supported 
the Republic merely as a matter of practicality. 
Intellectuals, such as Camus cited above, were deeply wounded by the defeat 
of the Republic. Having believed whole-heartedly that their cause was just and right, 
the shock seriously damaged the idealism of many thinkers in the United States and 
Britain. The sense of lost innocence, resulting both from the defeat and the realization 
of Soviet machinations, made the Spanish Civil War doubly romantic in hindsight. 
Intellectuals and idealists continued an interpretation of pro-Republicans as 
“premature anti-Fascists”, Cassandras of the democratic cause, who fought against a 
clearly “evil” opponent without the support of their countries. Writing after the 
Second World War, playwright John Osborne speaks through one of his characters, “I 
suppose people of our generation aren’t able to die for good causes any longer. We 
had all that done for us, in the thirties and forties, when we were still kids… There 
aren’t any good, brave causes left.”26 This is surely the popular interpretation, such as 
it is, of Anglo-American and Irish involvement in the Spanish Civil War. While it 
neglects the brutal and Stalinist tendencies of the Madrid government, it recalls 
enough of the truth to satisfy the historian, scholar, and political activist.
26
 Quoted in The Last Great Cause, 2.
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There is a feeling that, for pro-Republicans, the Spanish Civil War was indeed 
an unambiguously good cause. Perhaps this results from comparison with the seeming 
pointlessness of Vietnam or perhaps from the faults of popular memory, which has 
forgotten the repression of Barcelona and the ‘Trotskyists’. It may be a much happier 
conclusion to think that the Spanish Civil War was a struggle in which idealistic 
supporters of both sides forgot their differences and pulled together in what both sides 
termed “a crusade”. Perhaps the fact that neither the Republicans nor the Nationalists 
were angels allows backers of both sides to claim they were fighting totalitarianism, 
surely a noble goal. Perhaps it could be agreed that in 1936 activists of all stripes 
recalled John Donne and remembered that no man, or nation, is an island and worked 
to stem the rising tide of darkness which threatened to wash Spain into the abyss.
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